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Abstract: 
 
 
This paper examines stock returns and trading activities around earnings announcements for 
listed companies in the Saudi stock market (SSM). Specifically, we examine the levels of 
stock liquidity, trading activity, volatility, bid-ask spread, asymmetric information and 
investor trading behaviour around earnings announcements for all firms in the market for the 
period 2002-2009. Abnormal price and volume reactions around earnings announcements 
suggest that these announcements produce highly informative contents. The magnitude of the 
cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcement is induced by trading activity in 
the two weeks before the release date. We also show evidence of an increased adverse 
selection cost around earnings announcement, which is then gradually reduced in the post-
announcement period, indicating that earnings announcements reduce uncertainty in the 
market. We also examine trading behaviour among small and large investors in the market 
through constructing order imbalance measures. In general, large investors are more 
sophisticated and show higher informed trading before earnings announcements whereas 
smaller investors show stronger reaction to news. Moreover, small investors show a buying 
pattern which is consistent with times-series based earnings surprise. They are net-buyers for 
good news and net-sellers for bad news portfolios.  
 
 
 Corresponding author:  zahraniaa@ipa.edu.sa 
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1 Introduction 
 
Our paper is motivated by many factors: first, we investigate the Saudi stock market 
(hereafter, SSM) to provide out-of-sample evidence regarding the on-going debate about 
Post-Earnings Announcements Drift (PEAD) and the way in which it can be explained, 
because the nature of this anomaly is not well understood. Second, the SSM is dominated by 
individual investors, 90% of its total trading, which provides an ideal setting for studying 
how investors react to informational events. Third, the SSM has unique institutional 
characteristics which make it suitable to test for these characteristics on stock returns and 
trading activities. For instance, it allows no short selling nor derivatives trading. Moreover 
few analysts follow the market and reports are scarce and not regularly published, which 
makes it hard to anticipate earnings and news in the market. Finally, the SSM is an order-
driven market; thus, analysing traders‟ placement strategies around earnings announcements 
provides an insight which is applicable to other order-driven markets. 
 
All these factors motivate us to study how information content affects trading behaviour 
around earnings announcements. It is of great value to both academics and practitioners to 
study the effect of these unique aspects on stock trading and return behaviour. 
 
The paper is organized as following. Section discusses the literature review. Sections 3 & 4 
illustrate the data and methodology used to implement the event study. Section 5 documents 
the event study restuls. Section 6 empirically examines the magnitude of abnormal returns 
and information asymmetry around earnings announcments.  Finally, Section 7 summarizes 
and concludes.   
 
2 Literature review 
 
For over 40 years, researchers have consistently documented the phenomena in stock markets 
where stock prices tend to drift in the direction of the earnings surprise following earnings 
announcements; this phenomenon is called Post-Earnings Announcements Drift (PEAD). In 
this study, we explore the trading activities around earnings announcements with the aim of 
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examining how investors and the market in aggregate level behave around earnings 
announcements. This behaviour is reflected in trading volume, volatility, bid/ask spread, 
abnormal returns, order imbalance and other factors. A vast body of research has documented 
the tendency of stock price returns to show a continuous drift after the release of earnings 
announcement .The systematic increase in price returns around earnings announcements can 
be observed in periods either before or after earnings announcements .Early event studies 
even document that the information content of earnings announcement not only affects 
returns, but other stock characteristics of trading, such as higher abnormal trading volume 
surrounding announcements (Beaver, 1968).  
 
Many researchers have confirmed the robustness of PEAD using different techniques and 
different data (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989;Ball, 1992). Findings of research on the 
capital market suggest that earnings announcements contain information which is believed to 
alter investors‟ opinion about the values of stocks, through the process of impounding 
information into prices. This impounding of information into prices and trading activities 
suggests the existence of privately informed traders and leakage of information 
 
 
PEAD is typically explained by the magnitude of the earnings surprises or unexpected 
component of the earnings. The higher the surprise (the difference between anticipated 
earnings and actual earnings), the higher the drift found. In attempting to explain the drift, 
many studies have distinguished between individual trading and institutional trading and 
suggest that institutional trading is more sophisticated than individual trading. On this basis, 
individual trading may be more closely related than institutional trading is to market 
inefficiencies in general and PEAD in particular (see, for instance, Walther, 1997; Berkman 
et al., 2009).  However, recent research provides some evidence that even relatively more 
sophisticated investors have difficulty in processing financial information which could delay 
the price reaction to news (Callen et al., 2005). 
 
Analysing trading activities around earnings announcements should provide us with a clearer 
picture of the way in which different aspects of the market respond in general, not only the 
stock returns. The persistent increase of stock returns can be induced by factors other than the 
earnings surprise. Liquidity, level of information asymmetry, trading volume and order 
imbalance can all have major effects on price drift.  
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Trading volume and volatility 
In general, stock returns and trading volume tend to be positively correlated. Stocks tend to 
rise on high volume and decline on low volume.
1
 Most of the theories explaining the volume-
return relationship emphasise the dispersion of beliefs among investors. Earnings 
announcements provide an ideal environment to test the volume effect on returns, because 
they are regular, exogenous, generate substantial volume and have almost fixed intervals 
(Frazzini and Lamont, 2007). 
 
 Past empirical work shows that stock returns around earnings announcements are usually 
associated with an increase in trading volume and volatility. Trading volume usually 
increases in response to earnings announcements, due to the reduction of information 
uncertainty among investors.  In addition, as some researchers suggest, investors have 
different levels of ability to process information and may interpret earnings news differently, 
hence responding differently (Karpoff, 1986; and Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). 
 
Other researchers have explained the relationship between volume and returns in the context 
of noise traders. Higher trading volume indicates the presence of irrational or noise traders, 
who push up prices (Baker and Stein, 2004). Other similar explanations have focused on the 
“attention-grabbing hypothesis”, under which individual traders have limited attention and 
rarely use short selling. If a stock attracts their attention, they are likely to buy it, regardless 
of the nature of the news good or bad. This hypothesis predicts that stocks in the news have 
both high volume and high net buying by individuals (Barber and Odean, 2008). 
 
Frazzini and Lamont (2007) find that, around earnings announcements, stocks with high 
volume have subsequently both high premiums and high imputed buying by individual 
investors.  
 
If new information is believed to either increase or decrease uncertainty in the market, then 
we can safely assume that volatility will also change around earnings announcements. The 
increase in return volatility and trading volume around earnings announcements compared 
with non-announcement periods is well documented in the literature. However, the 
relationship property between volatility in the post-announcement period and the content or 
precision of the earnings announcement cannot be exactly defined.  
                                                        
1 See, among others, Karpoff‟s review of the subject (1987) 
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Acker (2002) links volatility with the content of the earnings announcement. If an 
announcement is easy to interpret or contains good news, an increase in volatility is usually 
observed on the day of the announcement, while bad news or difficult-to-interpret news has a 
delayed price and volatility reaction until the following day.  
 
Liquidity and information asymmetry 
Hakansson (1977) shows that if investors differ in their information acquisition abilities or 
resources, different patterns of information acquisition and processing emerge. In making 
investment decisions, investors with low information processing skills or resources (small 
investors) tend to rely on public information, whereas more sophisticated investors with 
better information processing skills or resources rely on pre-disclosure information. Kim and 
Verrecchia( 1991) suggest that since some investors are asymmetrically informed before the 
anticipated announcement, they may respond to it differently.  
 
Demsetz (1968) proposes the bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity where the spread 
reflects the adverse selection costs entailed by asymmetric information among investors. 
Higher information asymmetry would increase the adverse selection cost and this is reflected 
in a wider bid-ask spread.  More recent papers have shown that adverse selection or 
information asymmetry component represents a significant portion of the spread and that 
increased adverse selection cost is the dominant factor affecting bid-ask spread around 
earnings announcements. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that, due to the different levels of 
ability of market participants to process information, information asymmetry should not only 
increase on the day before the announcement, but should also stay at a high level in the post-
announcement period, since some investors are better able to interpret news than other. Some 
participants, for example, process the public information (earnings announcements) into 
private information about a firm‟s performance and make better informed judgements. 
 
Chiang and Venkalesh (1986) and Glosten and Harris, (1988) among many others, suggest 
that spreads are negatively associated with trading volume and share price but positively 
associated with return volatility. Affleck-Graves et al. (2002) find that, on the day of the 
announcement, the adverse selection component of the spread increases. They also find that 
component increases even before the announcement day and suggest that spread is used as a 
proxy for both information asymmetry and market liquidity. Handa et al. (2003) argue that 
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spread serves also as a proxy of information asymmetry in an order-driven market, because it 
is a function of adverse selection and also of difference in valuation among investors. 
 
The inconclusive evidence of information asymmetry and liquidity behaviour around 
earnings announcements has been explained by Krinsky and Lee (1996), who investigate the 
spread components around earnings announcements and find an offsetting effect.  While 
other components decrease because of higher trading volume, adverse selection costs 
increase because some traders have a superior capacity to estimate firm performance.  
 
Because the SSM is an order-driven market, we also study the traders‟ order placement 
strategies around the release of this accounting information by classifying traders into two 
categories, large and small. The different analyses allow us to infer the effect of earnings 
announcements on the level of information asymmetry and market liquidity among different 
types of investor. 
 
 Since earnings announcements convey new information to the market as observed through a 
reduction in information asymmetry, some investors will actively seek information in the pre-
disclosure period which will be reflected in the concentration of trading activities before the 
earnings announcement. Trading activities can be examined by various groups of variables 
(i.e., trading volume, bid/ask spread and number of buy and sell orders in the market). On the 
basis of the earlier arguments, we expect quarterly earnings announcements in the SSM to 
exhibit significant abnormal returns, higher abnormal trading volume, wider bid-ask spread 
and more net buying by small traders.  We also predict that the stock market reaction occurs 
even before the day of the earnings announcement, for some investors will be actively 
seeking information in this period and this will increase the information asymmetry before 
the expected release date.  
 
Like Lakhal (2008), we conjecture that, in an order-driven market such as the SSM, earnings 
announcements are likely to narrow the subsequent bid-ask spread and to increase trading 
volume around the day of the announcement, thus improving market liquidity and reducing 
information asymmetry. We also anticipate that the spread increases before the 
announcement is made, because liquidity traders widen the spread in order to compensate for 
their potential losses from trading with informed traders.  
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3 Data 
We use three sets of data: 
1) Earnings announcements data which are recorded manually from the official stock 
exchange bulletin (Tadawul) with their time and date stamped.  We document 2,437 quarterly 
earnings announcements covering the period between Q1 in 2002 and Q2 in 2009. After 
removing announcements whose time or date cannot be verified or announcements 
coinciding with those of other corporate events, we are left with 2170 earnings 
announcements. For each observation, we document the date, earnings and nature of the news 
as good or bad, compared either with the reaction of prices to the news on the announcement 
day or to a seasonal ranking walk surprise measure.  Ninety-five listed firms are included in 
the sample, which each have at least six observations (earnings announcements). 
2
 
2) Data regarding stock daily prices for all stocks and market index were provided by the 
official stock exchange bulletin, Tadawul. It includes the following fields: Close, High, Low, 
Volume, Value and Trades for the eight-year period of 2002-2009. 
3) Intraday data for all trades stamped to the nearest minute for the same period with the 
same field for the daily stock data. These data are extracted with a programming capability 
which stores and processes all historical data. Current high frequency data providers in the 
SSM provide data only for the last 25 days. These data were used for estimating the bid- ask 
spread, calculating order imbalance, classifying traders into small and large, computing the 
number of buyer and seller initiated trades and finally for computing intraday volatility.  
All the listed companies in the SSM are required to publish their earnings in the 
fortnight starting from the last day of the quarter, but the exact timing of announcements is 
not known until they have been made public. At the end of each financial year, 
announcements must be made in the first forty days from the end of each company‟s 
financial year.  
Our unique datasets allow us to precisely investigate trading activities around 
earnings announcements in more detail, since intraday data has never been used in this 
market. 
 
                                                        
2 The sample firms represent around 95% of the total market value , only newly-found firms which haven‟t 
made operating earnings were excluded. 
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4 Methodology 
We first use standard event study to capture the informativeness of earnings announcements 
through estimating daily abnormal returns, trading activity measures, volatility and spread 
over time.
3
  To compute abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR), we  
consider the following two return generating models (i.e., models for „normal returns‟):  
A) Market-adjusted return model               
 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕= 𝑹𝒊𝒕 − 𝑹𝒎𝒕  (1)  
 
Where the abnormal return is the difference between the raw return 𝑅𝑖𝑡  and the market return 
(TASI index) 𝑅𝑚𝑡  at time t, 
B) Market model where returns are estimated using the following equation: 
 𝐄(𝐑𝐢𝐭) = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝐢 (𝐑𝐦𝐭) (2)  
 
Then estimated returns are subtracted from the raw returns   𝑹𝒊𝒕 to formulate the abnormal 
returns  𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕 . If an earnings announcement occurs within trading hours, then the 
announcement day is labelled day 0. If an announcement is made after the close of the day, 
then day 0 is the next trading day.   The abnormal return for a given day is computed as the 
difference between the realised returns predicted from the market model and the raw 
returns 𝑅𝑖𝑡 .  Abnormal returns are then aggregated across two dimensions, across events or 
firms (cross-section) and across a time interval [t1, t2]. Within the event window sample, the 
cross-sectional averages of all stock returns and other measures are constructed for each day 
and then a time series of cross-section averages is computed for the whole event window. To 
construct a control sample, the time series for each stock [-100,-11] relative to the day of the 
earnings announcement (day 0) is formed, to estimate the parameters. The time-series 
averages of these cross-sectional measures are then calculated to arrive at a single number 
which represents the control for comparison purposes for the measures of trading activity. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are then computed for various windows around the 
event day.  We define our event period to be various event windows [-10, +10], [-5, +5] and 
[-1, +1], so as to fully capture the earnings announcements effects. We focus on stock returns 
                                                        
3 For reviews of the subject and event study econometrics, see MacKinlay (1997); Campbell et al. (1997); 
Binder(1998); and Kothari and Warner (2007). 
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and trading activity during the 21-, 11- and 3-day event windows around earnings 
announcements. 
 
 
 Measures of trading activities and information asymmetry 
 
For trading activates, we assign our “normal period” for trading activities to be days [-30,-
11]. We then construct our measure of abnormal trading activity for each day in the event 
window relative to our “normal” control period. We compare the behaviour pattern of each 
variable around the earnings announcement to its “normal behaviour” estimated from the 
non- announcement control period (benchmark period). For each variable chosen, the 
abnormal measure is normalised and defined as:  
 
𝑽𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕 − 𝑽 𝒃𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌
 𝑽𝒂𝒓(𝑽 𝒃𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌)
 
 
 
Where Vevent   is the event period interval,  𝑉 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐 ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘   is the mean value over the benchmark 
period intervals [-30,-11] and   𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑉 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐 ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 )  is the standard deviation over the control 
period [-30,-11]. Because we are interested in observing the change in trading activity around 
corporate events, we do not focus on the level of trading activity, but rather in recognising 
unusual activity. The deviation from normal trading activity is measured through normalising 
these trading activities.  
 
We use various measures of trading activates which have been used in the literature to 
capture the market behaviour before, during and after the earnings announcement day. We 
consider three different measures of trading activity; trading volume (TV) in SAR, share 
turnover (Turnover) which is computed as a percentage of the daily volume traded relative to 
outstanding shares and the number of trades (NT), since these measures have been used 
frequently to proxy for the level of trading activity.  For the remaining variables, we define 
each variable and document how it is computed below. 
For the volatility measure we use the intraday high-low price range. For the liquidity and 
information asymmetry, we use three measures: the bid-ask spread, order imbalance and 
overnight indicator. We define each variable and document according to the way in which it 
is computed. 
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Volatility (VOL) is measured as daily High and Low prices scaled by Low prices. The 
market volatility is expected to increase around the date of the earnings announcement due to 
the release of price-sensitive information.  We compute our volatility measure similarly to 
those of Bushee et al. (2003) which can be written as follows:   
       
 
       
 
𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕 =
𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑯 − 𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑳
𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑳  
  
(3)  
    
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡   denotes respectively the highest (H) and the lowest (L) prices for firm i and day t. 
Bid-ask spreads are used as a proxy for both information asymmetry and liquidity.  Spreads 
are commonly considered a proxy for information asymmetry .The wider spreads reflect the 
higher adverse selection cost, as suggested by many researchers (see, for example, Coller and 
Yohn, 1997; Affleck-Graves et al., 2002).   The order processing and inventory components 
reflect the liquidity while the adverse selection component reflects the information 
asymmetry.  We follow Affleck-Graves et al. (2002), who suggest using the bid-ask spread as 
proxy for both the liquidity and information asymmetry.  
 
Since quote data are not directly available in the SSM, we estimate the spread using high 
frequency data (with one-minute intervals). We make use of the covariance model of George 
et al. (1991) which shows how the first-order auto-correlation in stock returns can be used to 
estimate the bid-ask spread.  
They estimate the informational asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread, ∅i,m = 1 −
πi,m  which is that part of the spread that is derived from the information asymmetry of firm i 
and time 𝑚 . George et al (1991) used daily prices, but we use intraday prices at one-minute 
intervals; hence, we give the time period the subscription 𝑚. Furthermore, πi,m   represents 
that part of the spread which is not due to information asymmetry.  The spread estimation 
equation can be written as follows: 
 
 
 𝝅𝒊,𝒎 =
𝟐 −𝒄𝒐𝒗  𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕 ,𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
𝑺𝒊,𝒅
 
 
(4)  
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where 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡  = 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑇𝑡 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝐿𝑡    is the difference between the intraday returns of the 
transaction prices 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑇𝑡   and bid prices 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝐿𝑡   (intraday Low prices) ,𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1     is the  one- 
minute lag of  𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡   , 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑇𝑡    is the  1-minute intraday return of firm i using the transaction 
prices of the time interval between t-1 and t,  𝑅𝐷𝑖𝐿𝑡     is the  1-minute intraday return of firm i 
using bid prices computed between time t-1 and time t,  𝑆𝑖 ,𝑑   is the average of intraday bid-
ask spreads of all transactions recorded for firm i on day d and finally 𝑐𝑜𝑣  𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡  , 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1  is 
the serial covariance of 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡  .
4
 
 
 
The overnight indicator (ONI) of Gallo and Pacini (2000) is used to measure the 
disagreement and dispersion of opinion among investors regarding the fundamental value of 
a stock. ONI represents the surprise between the closing of one day and the opening of the 
next day; we find this a good proxy for information asymmetry and arrival in the SSM.
5
 It is 
calculated as follows: 
 
𝑶𝑵𝑰𝒕 =   𝒍𝒐𝒈
𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏
𝒕
𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒕−𝟏
  
 
(5)  
 
In principle, there should be no increase of information arrival in the immediate pre-
announcement period beyond that of the non-announcement period.  The SSM has few 
reports which publicly forecast and publish future anticipated sales and earnings; therefore, 
the overnight indicator should provide us with a precise measure of information asymmetry 
and informational arrival.   
 
In our study, we also use Order Imbalance (OI) as another proxy for information asymmetry 
and examine the way in which it influences volume and returns. Order imbalance has 
frequently been used in the market microstructure literature as a proxy for informed trading 
and for liquidity asymmetry. OI is the excess of net buying or selling orders at one time 
which reflect the forces behind the orders. The OI is then classified by types of investor, 
whether small or large. Any large positive order imbalance in the stock, indicates excess 
buying, while a large negative order imbalance indicates excess selling. For this purpose we 
use Lee and Ready‟s “Tick Rule Test” (1991), which infers trade direction using trade to 
                                                        
4 Van Ness et al. (2001) have examined several spread decomposition models and concluded that no single 
model appears to perform better than the others. 
5 Gregoriou et al. (2005) and many others have used the variance of analysts‟ forecasts as a proxy for the 
diversity of opinion amongst investors. However, in the SSM, it is not possible to obtain such data. 
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trade prices. If the price change between trades is positive, then the transaction is coded as a 
buy-initiated trade. A negative price change yields a sell-initiated trade.  Like Shanthikumar 
(2004), we define order imbalance as follows: 
 
 
𝑶𝑰𝒊.𝒙.𝒕 =
𝑩𝒖𝒚𝒔𝒊,𝒙,𝒕 − 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒙,𝒕
𝑩𝒖𝒚𝒔𝒊,𝒙,𝒕 + 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒙,𝒕
 
 
(6)  
 
 
Where we add all buyer and seller initiated trades for firm 𝑖  and investor type 𝑥   at time t. A 
positive OI indicates net-buying while negative outcome indicates net-selling. We classify 
investors into small and large, according the value of the transaction. We use two primary 
cut-offs to classify investors of type x with a buffer between small and large trades to reduce 
noise, a method which has been used by Shanthikumar (2004), and Chiang and Wang (2007). 
The lower cut-off is all trades with a value of SAR 75,000 or lower (USD 20,000) and the 
higher cut-off is all trades with a value of SAR 250, 000 or higher (USD 66,666). 
  
 
5 Event study results 
 
We first show results which examine the informativeness of earnings announcements 
measured by stock price reaction in the event window, more precisely by cumulative 
abnormal returns, CARs, around earnings announcements. We calculate abnormal returns 
using two models, the market model and the market adjusted model. Once we have computed 
the abnormal returns, we construct two event windows [-5,+5] to measure CAR  in the eleven 
days around the announcement day (0) and a smaller event window[-1,+1] to measure 
immediate reaction to public announcements. 
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  Table 1 : Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around Earnings Announcements. 
Panel A: 
Market model 
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕−(𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜷𝒊 𝑹𝒎𝒕) 
All  
(N= 2133) 
Good 
( N=790) 
Bad 
( N=1003) 
Neutral 
(N=338) 
CAR(-5,+5) 
-.01633   *** 
(.0018)  -8.91 
0.0111*** 
(.0030) 3.66 
-.0397*** 
(.0027)-14.63 
-.0112*** 
(.0028)-3.98 
Car(-1,+1) 
-.0110*** 
(.0013)-7.29 
.01354  *** 
(.0023)   5.83 
-.0314  *** 
(.0019)   -16.31 
-.01002 *** 
(.0020)-4.82 
Panel B: 
Market adjusted returns 
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕= 𝑹𝒊𝒕 − 𝑹𝒎𝒕   
All  
(N=2179) 
Good 
( N=961) 
Bad  
(N=1218) 
Neutral 
(N=247) 
CAR(-5,+5) 
-.00079*** 
(.0002) -3.69 
0.01194*** 
(0.0003) 
-.01180 *** 
(.0003) -30.61 
-.0003*** 
(.00007) -4.55 
Car(-1,+1) 
-.00462*** 
(0.0012) 3.67 
.04006 *** 
( .0014)26.89 
-.0398 *** 
(.0011) -33.70 
0.0002 
( .0001) 0.13 
Notes: reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) along with the test statistic for Good, 
Bad and Neutral portfolios and across different event windows (-5,+5) and (-1,+1). The T-test of 
average stock price response to earnings announcements around different event windows is 
shown as follows:  t − statistics =
CAAR (t1,t2)
 (K+1)sAAR t
2
 .Estimated standard errors are reported in 
parentheses after each CAR, along with t-statistics values. Significance levels are reported as *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Portfolios were constructed on the basis of the earnings announcement return (EAR) 
on days (0, +1). A positive EAR belongs to the good news portfolio, whereas a negative EAR 
is in the bad news portfolio and the neutral  portfolio is one which contains all the stocks that 
have the lowest 10%  absolute EAR during the announcement day (0, +1). In general, it was 
found that market reaction was negative in the days around earnings announcements, but this 
could be a reflection of the higher incidence of bad news at the time of the study.  The CARs 
in panel A were computed using the market model, which produces different behaviour of 
CARs than the ones computed using the market adjusted model in Panel B. The latter 
assumes changing the expected return but is constant among firms and discounts matching 
the market return with the firm raw return, while the former measures the linear relationship 
between a stock and a market return and discounts only that relationship from the raw 
returns. However, all CARs are statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the 
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market in general reacts positively (negatively) to good (bad) news and that public earnings 
announcements change the perceived value of a stock. Panel A reports asymmetry in the 
price reaction between good and bad news portfolios for both event windows (-5, +5) and (-1, 
+1). The bad portfolio shows a higher CAR at (-3.9%) and (-3.2%) for both event windows 
while a good portfolio exhibits an averages of 1.1% for one window and 1.3% for the other 
windows. The different price reactions to bad news and good news have been found in many 
studies (see Hayn, 1995, for example). The underreaction to good news has been established 
and explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis.   When using market adjusted returns, the 
asymmetry of CAR disappears altogether; we see a similar reaction to good and bad news at 
1.1% (-1.1) and 4% (-3.9%) for good (bad) portfolios in the event windows (-5, +5) and (-1, 
+1), respectively.  
 
Abnormal Trading activity 
 
we present average abnormal returns (AARs) along with three measures of abnormal trading 
(AT). We focus on AT, by taking each daily measure of trading activity during the event 
window (-5, +10), subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation over the 
control period, (- 30, -11).  
Under the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns or trading activities of the event window 
have the same distribution as non-event (control period) returns or trading activity, we test 
for differences between each daily trading activity in the event window against the average of 
the control period of the event window [-30,-11].  Abnormal dollar (riyal) trading volumes 
are highly significant; however, there is mostly negative reaction in the five days before the 
event day (0). A higher than average significant positive reaction is experienced one day 
before the announcement and stays mainly positive until day 7. This pattern of a negative 
trading activity reaction in the pre-announcement period followed by a positive one is also 
observed in the turnover and number of trades. Turnover is negative and significant in days (-
3) and (-2). The number of trades is also negative and significant in all of the week before the 
announcement day, but both the turnover and the number of trades shows positive and 
significant reaction during and after the announcement day. However, the positive reaction is 
more persistent in the dollar trading volume and turnover than in the number of trades. 
 
In general, this result indicates that daily trading activity during the event period significantly 
exceeds the mean daily activity over the control period [-30,-11]. These findings suggest that 
there is systematic evidence of informed trading before the release of earnings 
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announcements. The substantial increase in trading activity subsequent to the announcement 
on the event day (0) in particular is consistent with the finding in cumulative abnormal 
returns where the market reaction to new information indicates the informativeness of these 
announcements. 
 
Table 2 :Abnormal Returns and Trading Activity around Earnings Announcements. 
Days 
Abnormal Returns 
% 
Abnormal Dollar   
Volume 
Turnover Number of trades 
-5 0.04 
(0.61) 
- 0.45 
(-1.22) 
-0.41 
(-0.97) 
-0.014** 
(-2.53) 
-4 - 0.11* 
(-1.80) 
-0.49 *** 
(-2.65) 
-0.40 
(-1.28) 
-0.004 
(-1.34) 
-3 - 0.09 
(-1.33) 
- 0.45 *** 
(-3.03) 
-0.39* 
(-2.20) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.70) 
-2 - 0.07 
(-1.04) 
-0.45 ** 
(-2.23) 
-0.38*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.74) 
-1 - 0.10* 
(-1.70) 
1.42 * 
(-1.85) 
0.39 ** 
(1.98) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.20) 
0 - 0.17** 
(-2.34) 
1.10 *** 
(6.15) 
0.45 * 
(1.61) 
0.041*** 
(4.65) 
1 - 0.26*** 
(-3.65) 
0.85 
(1.29) 
0.39 
(0.03) 
0.045*** 
(5.01) 
2 - 0.09 
(-1.67) 
0.52 
(-1.38) 
0.37*** 
(2.10) 
0.022*** 
(2.20) 
3 - 0.06 
(-0.90) 
0.43*** 
(-2.84) 
0.37 *** 
(3.69) 
0.010 
(0.66) 
4 - 0.08 
(-1.34) 
0.32 *** 
(-2.64) 
0.38 *** 
(2.96) 
-0.005 
(-0.07) 
5 0.05 
(0.94) 
0.18 *** 
(-3.52) 
0.38 *** 
(2.59) 
-0.004 
(-0.10) 
6 - 0.01 
(-0.24) 
0.10 
(-1.13) 
0.37 *** 
(-3.51) 
0.004 
(0.13) 
7 0.20 *** 
(3.25) 
0.03 *** 
(-3.48) 
0.39 ** 
(-2.18) 
-0.007** 
(-1.69) 
8 0.03 
(0.34) 
- 0.03** 
(2.22) 
0.39 * 
(-2.00) 
-0.003 
(-0.26) 
9 0.29*** 
(4.87) 
-0.01** 
(2.44) 
0.42 
(-0.14) 
0.007 
(0.29) 
10 0.25*** 
(4.09) 
-0.04** 
(2.22) 
0.41 
(-0.47) 
-0.003 
(-1.14) 
Notes:  Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) represent the daily average cross-section market adjusted 
returns. The three measures of trading activity (TA) are dollar trading volume, turnover and number of 
trades. TA measures are normalised by the average and standard deviation of the estimation period [-30,-
11], as follows     
Vevent −V benchmark
 Var (V benchmark )
.For both Abnormal returns and TA measures, all hypotheses were 
accepted or rejected according to the t-statistic, formulated as follows:t =
AAR t
(var  AAR t  )
1
2 
,  
TA t
(var  TA t )
1
2 
 , 
respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based upon the null hypothesis that AAR 
(TA) is equal to 0(AT    ) and the alternative hypothesis which states that AAR (AT) is not equal to zero 
(AT    ). 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Liquidity and information asymmetry  
 
 
Table (3) reports the volatility, overnight indicator and bid-ask spreads around earnings 
announcements as measures of investors‟ disagreement and information asymmetry in the 
market. The variable spread is closely related to the liquidity level in the markets, whereas 
the overnight indicator should measure the arrival of information and disagreement between 
investors regarding the value of a security.  We measure price volatility by the difference 
between the highest and lowest prices scaled by lowest prices for every day in the event 
window (-5, +10). The overnight indicator (ONI) measures the dispersion of opinion among 
investors regarding the fundamental value of a stock. The ONI represents the surprise 
between the closing of one day and the opening of the next day; we find it a plausible proxy 
for information asymmetry and the arrival of information, as most corporate events and 
announcements happens toward the end of the trading day. The bid-ask spread is estimated 
from transaction prices using the model of George et al. (1991); hence, it may not reflect the 
actual quoted bid-ask spread. All variables were computed for every day in the event window 
(-5, +10) and compared with the averages for the non-event window [-30,-11]. 
 
Under the null hypothesis that information symmetry and the liquidity of the event window 
has the same distribution as those of the non-event (control period), we test for differences 
between each daily measure of liquidity and information asymmetry in the event window 
against the average of the control period of the event window [-30,-11].   
 
Volatility and the overnight indicator are higher at the time of the announcement and 
immediately following it. They steadily increase in magnitude over the five days before the 
announcement and peak on the day of the announcement and the day after (days 0 and +1).  
In the subsequent days, volatility declines but remains above the pre-announcement levels. 
The highest volatility in prices is found on the announcement day at 5%, which indicates 
different opinions and interpretation of news on the part of different types of investor. If 
investors in the market were homogeneous, then we should anticipate a lower level of 
volatility, at least in the announcement day. The t-statistics indicate that volatility is 
significantly higher than volatility in control period. 
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The ONI measures the rate of arrival of information in the market. It shows the highly 
significant arrival of information for every day in the pre-announcement period, indicating 
informed trading and engagement in private information seeking. The highest level of 
information arrival is found on day (1) and not on day (0), which can be explained by the fact 
that most of the news is made after the closing hour of day (0). The ONI declines 
substantially only 2 days after the announcement is made, to a lower level than before the 
announcement. Overall, bid-ask spreads increase around earnings announcements; however, 
they substantially decrease on the two days around the earnings announcement before they  
bounce back to the same level as in the pre-announcement period. Spread is significant on 
days (0) and (1) only, but shows no significant level in the week before or after the 
announcement period; however it remains high after the announcement period. Even though 
earnings announcements in the SSM are not scheduled, evidence from trading activity and 
information asymmetry suggests that announcements can be anticipated by some market 
participants. Many studies found no significant changes in spread surrounding earnings 
announcements, despite evidence that the adverse selection component of the spreads widens 
significantly (see, Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986; Krinsky and Lee, 1996). 
 
Since spread has three components and each component is induced by different factors, many 
previous researchers have suggested that these factors may have opposite directional effect 
and that this could explain the lack of evidence of changing spread around earnings 
announcements (Krinsky and Lee, 1996). For example, trading volume reduces the spread, 
due to lower order processing cost, while private information induces the adverse selection 
component of the spread, hence increasing the spread. Obviously, a high number of trades 
surrounding earnings announcements in the SSM will reduce inventory and order processing 
costs, which eventually narrows the spread.  
 
The pre-release information asymmetry level indicates disagreement between market 
participants about the content and implication of forthcoming earnings announcements, 
whereas the persistence in volatility after the announcement compared to the volatility of a 
non-event period suggests that different market participants have different levels of ability to 
process the content of the earnings announcements and supports the assumption that some 
investors convert public information into private.  Since the dates of announcements are not 
predictable in the SSM, most imminent days before earnings announcements show significant 
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levels of information asymmetry, indicating a higher incidence of private acquisition of 
information. 
 
These results support the hypothesis suggested by Kim and Verrecchia (1994), who explain 
the persistence of adverse selection problems after the announcement day by the varying 
abilities of investors to process corporate disclosure. An informed judgement based on 
earnings release increases the information asymmetry between different traders in the market.
  
Table 3: information asymmetry and liquidity around earnings announcements 
Days Volatility Overnight(ONI) Spread 
-5 4.0 
(0.51) 
0.11 ** 
(2.18) 
3.17 
(0.25) 
-4 4.1** 
(2.15) 
0.14 *** 
(5.07) 
3.16 
(0.81) 
-3 4.0 
(1.56) 
0.18 *** 
(4.80) 
3.08 
(0.31) 
-2 4.2*** 
(4.08) 
0.18 *** 
(5.47) 
3.14 
(0.28) 
-1 4.5*** 
(6.49) 
0.20 *** 
(5.37) 
3.19 
(1.62) 
0 5.0*** 
(12.97) 
0.21 *** 
(5.27) 
3.07** 
(2.00) 
1 4.8*** 
(9.93) 
0.25*** 
(6.20) 
3.13* 
(1.65) 
2 4.7*** 
(8.54) 
0.14 *** 
(2.44) 
3.18 
(0.68) 
3 4.4*** 
(6.26) 
0.12* 
(1.70) 
3.19 
(0.21) 
4 4.4*** 
(5.66) 
0.09 
(0.45) 
3.22 
(0.15) 
5 4.2*** 
(3.76) 
0.14* 
(1.69) 
2.19 
(0.34) 
6 4.1*** 
(2.72) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
3.21 
(0.38) 
7 4.2*** 
(3.05) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
3.18 
(0.75) 
8 4.1* 
(1.90) 
0.01 
(1.25) 
3.22 
(0.77) 
9 4.0 
(1.36) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
3.14 
(0.70) 
10 4.0 
(0.92) 
0.04 * 
(1.70) 
3.20 
(0.83) 
Notes: this table reports the volatility, overnight indicator and estimated bid-ask spread around earnings 
announcments along with their t-statistics. All variables are averaged cross-sectionally for all days in the event 
window (-5, +10).  All hypotheses were accepted or rejected according to the t-statistic, formulated as follows: 
  t =
Volatility t
(var  Volatility T  )
1
2 
,  
ONI t
(var  ONI T )
1
2 
 ,, 
Spread
(var  Spread T  )
1
2 
.The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based upon 
the null hypothesis that the daily cross-section average is equal to its time-series average in the estimation 
window [-30,-11].The alternative hypothesis states that the daily average is not equal to the normal period 
average. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Investors’ behaviour around earnings announcements 
 
In this section, we analyse different types of investor and the ways in which  they react to 
news. The aim is to examine any pattern in buying or selling and whether this pattern differs 
according to the type of investor. In other words, we investigate who is buying around 
earnings announcement dates. Many studies suggest that small investors are less rat ional and 
become net buyers around earnings announcements. Panel A in Table (4) reports order 
imbalance according to the type of investor. Assuming that different investors have different 
levels of ability and resources of information regarding the true value of a security, we use 
the value of trades to separate small and large investors. If this assumption is valid, we should 
observe different behaviour between the two groups. It is worth mentioning that because 
event window (-5,+10) is relatively short, we do not aim to examine trading strategy followed 
by investors  , but instead examine immediate reaction to news.  
 
The small investors order imbalance in Panel A indicates that they tend to buy more 
than sell around earnings announcements, whereas large investors tend to sell immediately 
after the announcements; they buy every day and sell  on days (-3,-2, 1, 2 and 5). Panel B 
shows the order imbalance split further by type of news. Good news is reported in subgroup 
(1) and bad news in subgroup (2). The good news portfolio shows interesting results: while 
large investors are mainly net-buyers in the pre-announcement period and net-sellers in most 
days after the announcement, small investors are net-buyers in the days immediately 
following the release of the news. The bad news portfolio in subgroup (2) indicates 
concentrated selling for small investors in days (1), (2) and 3),  while large investors show no 
strong pattern of selling around earnings announcements. The evidence suggests that small 
investors are less sophisticated in acquiring pre-announcement information and in 
interpreting news. Good news shows strong buying from small investors, while bad news 
shows strong selling by small investors. Conversely, large investors show that they buy 
shares in good news firms even before the announcement day and sell them afterwards. 
Moreover, large investors show a buying pattern on the day of bad news announcements and 
the next day. The evidence suggests informed trading and a higher ability to interpret news 
among large investors in the SSM. Our results are in some ways similar to those reported by 
Barber and Odean (2008), who surmise that individuals tend to be net-buyers whether the 
news is good or bad. Their buying behaviour is motivated by the attention-grabbing  
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hypothesis, under which any stock in the news experiences higher abnormal buying.  Our 
order imbalance results are also similar to those found in Shanthikumar (2004) and Chiang 
and Wang (2007), who use similar methodology and find that small investors in general react 
more strongly to earnings surprises than do large investors. Moreover, our results suggest that 
informed trading is associated with the size of the trades, evidenced by the buying of good 
news stocks by large investors in the pre-announcement period. 
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Table 4: Order Imbalance by Type of Investor and by Type of News. 
Days Order Imbalance  
(small investors) 
Order Imbalance 
(Large investors) 
 Panel A: Order imbalance by type of investor 
 
-5 -0.031 
-0.034 
0.026 
0.025 
0.015 
0.023 
0.016 
0.026 
0.025 
0.030 
-0.035 
-0.027 
0.028 
0.028 
0.035 
0.032 
0.023 
0.020 
-0.019 
-0.009 
0.020 
0.028 
-0.009 
-0.012 
-0.017 
0.021 
-0.015 
0.020 
0.032 
0.023 
0.024 
0.020 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 Panel B: order imbalance for Good and Bad news 
 (1) Good News (2) Bad news 
 Small investors Large investors Small investors Large investors 
-5 -0.76 4.08 1.04 1.29 
-4 -0.52 3.45 -0.15 2.22 
-3 -0.63 4.27 0.96 1.61 
-2 0.90 3.25 0.65 -2.03 
-1 -0.15 3.35 0.54 0.84 
0 0.79 4.26 0.47 1.88 
1 0.00 3.19 -1.67 0.92 
2 1.40 -1.10 -0.08 -2.98 
3 0.58 -2.21 -0.80 1.18 
4 0.90 -1.98 0.71 -2.80 
5 -0.70 3.73 0.33 1.95 
6 -0.35 -2.83 1.70 -1.37 
7 -0.64 -2.00 1.00 0.31 
8 1.62 2.71 -0.45 0.46 
9 1.22 3.98 0.01 1.14 
10 -0.66 -2.49 -0.39 -1.91 
Notes: This table presents the results of raw order imbalance, measured as follows: OIi.x.t =
Buys i ,x ,t−Sells i ,x ,t
Buys i ,x ,t +Sells i ,x ,t
  . 
Where all orders are classified into buy or sell initiated orders, then counted for firm i, investor type x (small or 
large) and date t.  Panel A reports the order imbalance for each group of investors. Panel B report an order 
imbalance for each group of investors and for type of news, either good or bad. Order imbalance is computed 
for all days in the event period (-5, +10) to show how different types of investors react to good and bad news. 
 
 
 
6 Regression 
 
We attempt to explain the magnitude of cumulative abnormal return, CAR (-1, +1) by 
estimating Equation (7).  OLS linear regression was used to test the hypothesis that the pre-
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announcement stock behaviour and level of trading activity have an effect on the magnitude 
of the abnormal returns on the announcement day. We use Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR) in the window (-1, +1) to capture the market reaction of the announcement. Then, We   
regress CAR on a set of variables which is expected to affect the magnitude of the stock 
return. For the pre-announcement explanatory variables, We include the price trend in the 
stock returns (momentum), cumulative overnight indicator, average abnormal volume. All 
the previous variables are computed using a time frame of the three weeks before the 
announcement day, that is, 15 trading days. We also include two firm characteristics; size 
measured in market value and the earnings surprise of the current quarter compared to same 
quarter of the previous year. Good (Bad) news portfolios contain all the companies which 
have positive (negative) CAR (-1, +1). 
 
 The aim is to test whether the level of pre-announcement trading activity or firm 
characteristic would have predictive power to explain the magnitude of the earnings 
announcement returns.  
 
We expect a positive relationship, positive (negative) coefficient estimates for the 
good (bad) subsamples for pre-announcement trading activity and the earnings surprise with 
regard to abnormal return. At the same time, we expect a negative relationship between firm 
size and the magnitude of price reaction CAR that is a negative (positive) coefficient sign for 
the good (bad) subsamples.  
 
A cross-sectional model is used to investigate the association between the absolute 
CARs and a set of pre-announcement variables covering trading activity and firm 
characteristics (Size and SUE) specific to the event observation. The model is constructed as 
follows: 
 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑴𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒖𝒎𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑶𝑵𝑰𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑨𝒃𝒗𝒐𝒍
         
𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑺𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
 
(7)  
where:   
1-Momentum is defined as the compounded stock returns for the past three trading weeks 
before the earnings announcement, where:   𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡
15
𝑡=1    and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily 
stock return for firm i and day t in the window [-16,-2]. 
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2-ONI is the summation of overnight indicators over the period [-16,-2] calculated as: 
 𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑖 =    𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛
𝑡
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡−1
 
15
𝑡=1
 
(8)  
 
3- 𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑜𝑙         is the average normalised abnormal volume which was first used by Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1989). It is computed as the residual of daily volume less mean daily volume scaled 
by trading volume standard deviation during the three weeks before an announcement [-16,-
2] as follows:  
 𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖 ,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−𝑇𝑉    𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝑖 ,𝑡
  , where   𝑇𝑉    𝑖 ,𝑡 =
1
20 
 𝑇𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡
20
𝑡=1 ,   is the average trading volume for 
20 days over the window of [-36,-17] and  𝜎𝑖 ,𝑡 =  
1
20
  𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡       
220
𝑡=1   , is the standard 
deviation of trading volume during the estimation period [-36,-17].  The daily estimated 
Abvol is then averaged as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑜𝑙         𝑖 =
1
15 
 𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑜𝑙
15
𝑡=1
 
 
(9)  
 
4- Standard unexpected earnings (SUE) are measured by scaling the unexpected earnings 
(seasonal random walk with a drift) to its standard deviation. The SUE for each firm i at 
quarter t is given by:  
 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
 
(10)  
 
 where ei,t  represents actual earnings and E(ei,t) is the expected earnings computed using a 
random walk model with drift E ei,t = et−4
i + δi , where δi  is the seasonal drift in a firm‟s 
earnings and σi,t  is estimated using the figures for the previous 8 quarters‟ earnings. 
5- Finally, Size variable is the market value of each firm at the time of the announcement. We 
multiply the number of outstanding shares by the closing price immediately before the 
earnings announcement day.  
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Table 1:  Cross-sectional Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns on Pre-
announcement trading activity and Firm Characteristics. 
 (1)                  (2) 
VARIABLES Good News Bad News 
   
Momentum 0.0140*** -0.00840** 
 (0.00538) (0.00416) 
ONI 0.000215** -0.000218*** 
 (0.000101) (4.67e-05) 
𝑨𝒃𝒗𝒐𝒍           0.000328** -0.000272** 
 (0.000128) (0.000109) 
SUE -0.000153* 0.000134*** 
 (5.95e-05) (4.26e-05) 
size -0.00130*** 0.00126*** 
 (0.000403) (0.000327) 
Constant 0.0402*** -0.0394*** 
 (0.00907) (0.00733) 
Observations 860 1131 
R-squared 0.058 0.065 
Note: This table presents regression coefficients of the earnings announcement returns 
CAR (-1, +1) on trading activity and firm characteristics for two types of disclosure 
(Good and Bad news portfolios) for 95 firms during the period 2002-2009 with 1991 as 
the total number of observations. Good (bad) news firms are defined according to the 
price reaction during the event window (-1, +1), while positive (negative) CARs are 
placed in the good (bad) news portfolios. *** p<0.01,*p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
 
As expected, all trading activity variables have a positive relationship with CAR for both 
types of news, good and bad. The price trend (momentum) has a positive relationship, 
positive (negative) coefficients with good (bad news) firms. The momentum was selected to 
show any pre-announcement trend in informed trading. A company which exhibited a price 
trend before the release of its earnings shows higher cumulative abnormal returns. However, 
the coefficient is higher for the good news firms at 1.4%, suggesting that traders in the good 
news firms engage actively in private information seeking. The ONI, which is a measure of 
investors‟ disagreement and information asymmetry in the market, also has a positive 
relationship with abnormal returns. In the two portfolios, the abnormal volume increases 
CAR and is significant at 5%. SUE shows a bizarre negative relationship which  is not 
expected, with significant coefficients at 10% and 1% for the good and bad news, 
respectively. SUE was measured using the seasonal random walk model, since analysts‟ 
forecasts are not available in the SSM. The time-series model has proven to be inaccurate, 
more precisely in the case of the Saudi market, where during the period of our study, the 
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price of oil and earnings per share (EPS) for the whole market rose to more than 400% 
between 2002 and 2009. Finally size, as expected, is negatively related to the cumulative 
abnormal returns, with positive (negative) coefficients for the bad (good) news which are 
significant at 1%. Larger companies in the SSM have substantial government and institution 
ownership and have better disclosure practices, which reduces information asymmetry and 
the reaction to news for such stocks. In general, pre-announcement trading activity and 
information asymmetry (momentum, overnight indicator and volume) have a positive 
relationship with cumulative abnormal returns. However, firm characteristics (SUE and Size) 
have a negative relationship with CAR. 
 
Liquidity, Information asymmetry around earnings announcement 
We first examine the change in liquidity (models 1 & 2 in table 6) around earnings 
announcements using an approach similar to that of Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) and Chan 
and Chunyan (2005), who examine the change in adverse selection cost around earnings 
announcements. We use the estimated bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity. Model (1) uses 
the effective estimated spread from the model of George et al. (1991) and model (2) uses a 
relative estimated spread which deflates the spreads relative to prices.  We use the estimated 
information asymmetry component of the spread in model (3), where we distinguish adverse 
selection cost behaviour with regard to good news and bad news firms. For each earnings 
announcement, we estimate the following regression model: 
 
𝑩𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑫𝟏𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝟐𝒊𝒕
+ 𝑩𝟔𝑫𝟑𝒊𝒕 +   𝜺𝒊𝒕 
(11)  
where:  
 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 =   Estimated spread of firm i on day t; 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  = High to low price range divided by low prices for firm i on day t; 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡= closing stock prices of firm i on day t; 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  =Ln (number of shares traded of firm i on day t multiplied by 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  ); 
D1it =1 for days -20 to - 2; zero otherwise (pre-announcement period); 
D2it =1 for days - 1 to +1; zero otherwise (announcement period); 
D3it =1 for days +2 to +20; zero otherwise (post-announcement period). 
 
Following the research design of Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) and Chan and Chunyan 
(2005), volatility, price and volume are used in the model to measure the inventory and order 
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processing cost, as suggested by the literature. Dummy variables measure the change in 
information asymmetry in the period before, during and after earnings announcements.  An 
increase in the volatility of a stock will increase its market risk, which would be reflected in 
market makers/participants increasing the spread. Therefore, in line with the literature, we 
expect volatility to widen the spread because the SSM is an order driven market which has no 
designated market makers. Price is assumed to have a negative relationship with regard to 
spread because order-processing costs are disproportionately higher for lower priced stocks 
(Demsetz, 1968). We also expect a negative relationship between the “Saudi Riyal” trading 
volume and the spread, because inventory and liquidation cost will decline with higher 
trading. The dummy variables are constructed to test how the information asymmetry 
component would affect the spread around earnings announcements. After controlling for 
other components of the spread, namely, the inventory and order processing costs, the higher 
level of information asymmetry should be reflected in positive coefficients between the bid-
ask spread and the dummy variable. 
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Table 2: Liquidity and Information Asymmetry around Quarterly Earnings 
Announcements. 
     
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Spread Relative 
Spread 
Information Asymmetry  
   Good Bad 
Volatility -2.062*** -0.0407***   
 (0.0206) (0.000756)   
Price -0.00478*** -0.000175***   
 (1.48e-05) (5.43e-07)   
Volume -0.0177*** -0.000121***   
 (0.000457) (1.68e-05)   
D1 -0.000505 -7.88e-05 0.0291*** -0.00746 
 (0.00158) (5.79e-05) (0.00884) (0.00869) 
D2 0.00991*** 0.000312*** 0.0303** 0.0148 
 (0.00247) (9.09e-05) (0.0128) (0.0127) 
D3 0.00961*** 0.000271*** 0.0175* -0.0171** 
 (0.00157) (5.79e-05) (0.00889) (0.00864) 
Constant 1.216*** 0.0266*** 0.370*** 0.754*** 
 (0.00755) (0.000278) (0.0444) (0.0459) 
Observations 105827 105827 58965 58110 
R-squared 0.573 0.531 0.651 0.689 
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients of the liquidity and 
information asymmetry components of volatility, stock price, volume and 
time dummies, representing the pre-announcement (D1), announcement 
(D2) and post-announcement periods (D3). Model (1) is run for the 
estimated spread, Model (2) uses relative spread (spread/price) and 
Model (3) uses the estimated adverse selection component  of the spread 
as a dependent variable, which was run separately for the good and bad 
news portfolios.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
As expected, spread is negatively associated with stock price and “Saudi Riyal” trading 
volume. However, volatility deviates from expectation and shows a negative coefficient too 
which could be a reflection of noise trading. A lot of noise trading is expected during this 
time.  
 
Controlling for the previous variables should mainly control for the inventory and order 
processing components of the spread.   The dummy variables show an increasing information 
asymmetry around and after earnings announcements (D2 and D3) with positive coefficients 
of around 0.01 which are significant at the 1% level. The information asymmetry in the pre-
announcement period (D1) shows negative coefficient, but this is not significant. In general, 
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information asymmetry remains at a high level after the announcement. These results are 
consistent with previous literature, maintaining that the different levels of ability among 
traders to interpret news aggravate the information asymmetry between them. 
Model (3) was used to confirm our original model of the spread around earnings 
announcements; this model uses dummies to control for the adverse selection component. In 
the information asymmetry model, we use an adverse selection component which was 
estimated using the model of George et al (1991) and run the same model again on time 
dummies.  We show whether this component would differ from or confirm the behaviour of 
the spread and time dummies in models 1 and 2. The behaviour of the information 
asymmetry component of the spread is reported for three periods, the pre-announcement 
period (D1), announcement period (D2) and post-announcement (D3). Regression was run 
separately for good news and bad news. Good and bad news firms were defined according to 
the earnings announcement return (EAR). Positive (negative) EAR is allocated in good (bad) 
groups. Because we are interested only in the information asymmetry component around 
earnings announcements, we report the dummies‟ coefficients and ignore the other 
coefficients of volatility, price  and volume.  
The behaviour of information asymmetry differs slightly in model (3) from that in the 
previous models, where information increased around and after the date of the earnings 
announcement. When we run the information asymmetry component and take into 
consideration the nature of the news, new and interesting results emerge. The good news 
firms show an increasing positive relationship of information asymmetry relative to the time 
of the announcement: information asymmetry gradually increases in the 20 days event 
window before the news and then peaks at the announcement period. Information asymmetry 
is then reduced after the announcement to the lowest level in the 20 days event window. The 
time dummy coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels for D1, D2 
and D3, respectively. Information asymmetry is reduced substantially in the post-
announcement period, suggesting that earnings announcements reduce uncertainty in the 
market. The bad news firms show different behaviour patterns for information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetries are at their highest level during the announcement period D2; the 
other two periods exhibit lower levels of information asymmetry. However, only period D3 
shows a negative coefficient of (-.017) which is significant at the 1% level. 
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The difference between good and bad news information asymmetry supports our conclusion 
in the price reaction regression, where we find that traders engage more actively in 
information seeking activities in the good news firms.  The evidence suggests that while 
other components of the spread, inventory and order processing are reduced around the time 
of earnings announcements, information asymmetry increases around this time. 
Our results are consistent with those of Chan and Chunyan (2005), who also find evidence of 
an increase in adverse selection cost around earnings announcements, using similar time 
dummies to show an information asymmetry reaction to earnings news. 
 
 
7 Summary 
 
This study analyses abnormal returns, trading activity (dollar volume, turnover and number 
of trades), and liquidity and information asymmetry for the Saudi stock market around its 
quarterly earnings announcements. We use a sample of 2,437 quarterly earnings 
announcements which covers all listed and operating firms in the period from 2002-2009. We 
examine the market reaction to news through computing market adjusted abnormal returns 
over various event windows. We also examine the changes in different measurements of 
trading activity, liquidity, volatility, asymmetric information and in the traders‟ order 
placement strategies.  In general, we find a significant increase in abnormal returns, increases 
in trading volume, a significant shift in systematic risk, widening bid-ask spread and above 
average stock price variability.  
The highly significant abnormal returns around earnings announcements indicate the 
importance and informativeness of the information content of these announcements.  We 
observe a rise in trading activities and volatility around earnings announcement with a higher 
information asymmetry which gradually reduces in the 20 days following the announcement 
date. The persistence of volatility and information asymmetry in the post announcement 
period can be explained by the heterogeneity in investors‟ ability to process the information 
in the public announcement, which indicates that investors may respond differently to news.  
  
When examining trading behaviour among small and large investors in the market through 
order imbalance measures, we find that large investors are more sophisticated and show 
higher informed trading before earnings announcements, whereas smaller investors show a 
stronger reaction to news. Moreover, small investors show a buying pattern which is 
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consistent with the earnings surprise. Our investors trading placements around earnings 
announcements is similar to those found Barber and Odean (2008) and Hirshleifer et al. 
(2008).  However, we find that small investors are net-buyers for the good news and net-
sellers for the bad news in the 3 days following earnings releases.  
 
We investigate further the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and 
find it to be positively related to information asymmetry and trading activity in the pre-
announcement period (15 trading days before earnings announcements). CAR is reduced by 
the size of the company: larger companies which have higher institutional ownership and 
better disclosure practices show a lower CAR around earnings announcement. Surprisingly, 
CAR seems to converse effect of the time-series earnings surprise, SUE.  One explanation of 
this relationship is that time-series coefficients show downward bias in their estimating of the 
earnings forecasts, since the market shows an exceptionally high growth in EPS for the years 
2002-2009. Hence, SUE does not accurately measure the earnings surprise in the SSM.  
 
Finally, liquidity measured by the bid-ask spread is negatively associated with stock 
return volatility, stock price level and riyal trading volume. The time dummy variables which 
control for other spread components and test for information asymmetry indicate increasing 
spread around the date of earnings announcements which remains relatively high in the 
following 20 days.  An earnings release as suggested by Kim and Verrecchia (1994) 
motivates informed judgement, creating information asymmetry between traders in the 
market which can lasts for some time after the announcement. 
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Appendix 
 
The following graphs depict the daily cross-section average of all observations for the event 
window (-30,+30) for 2179 earnings announcements.  
Figure 1: Daily estimated Average Bid-Ask Spread using the model of  
George et al. (1991) 
 
 
Figure 2 : Daily Overnight Indicator measured as: 𝑶𝑵𝑰𝒕 =   𝒍𝒐𝒈
𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕
𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒕−𝟏
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Figure 3: Cross –section Average Volatility measured: 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕 =
𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑯 −𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑳
𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑳  
 
 
Figure 4: Daily average Turnover (number of stocks divided by the number of outstanding shares). 
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Figure 5: Average Number of trades per day 
 
 
Figure 6: Average Abnormal Returns for all earnings announcements (2,437) before data cleaning  
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